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Trade theory has long argued that while it may be in the best interests of large a country to pursue
reciprocal trade agreement to escape from a terms-of-trade driven prisoners’ dilemma, the best
course of action for a small country is always unilateral trade liberalization. This prediction is
inconsistent with the growing number of reciprocal agreements involving a small country and
large country/region. Using simulation results from a quantitative trade model of North America I
am able to shed light on why small and large countries pursue reciprocal trade agreements. I show
that the non-cooperative and cooperative payoffs implicit in recent North American trade
agreements between a small country and a large country/region (that is, the CFTA and NAFTA)
take on the form of the well-known prisoners’ dilemma. In particular, I find that irrespective of
country size unilateral liberalization makes the liberalizing country worse off, while making its
regional trading partner better off, and that cooperative agreements make all liberalizing partners
better off.
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1  Introduction
Despite the considerable effort that has gone into global trade agreements, such as the General
Agreement on Tariffs and Trade, much of the trade liberalization achieved in the postwar era has
in fact come from far-reaching reciprocal regional trade agreements that have involved just a few
players. Early regional trade pacts, such as the European Union (EU), involved countries of
roughly equal size, while the trend over the last decade has been for regional agreements that
bring together one or more small countries and a large country or an established free-trade zone.
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This trend has captured the attention of trade theorist because while trade theory argues that the
best course of action for large countries is reciprocal trade agreements, it also argues that the best
course of action for a small country is always unilateral trade liberalization.
2
The theory underlying reciprocal trade liberalization agreements evolved from the optimal
tariff literature, which dates back to Scitovsky (1942). The basic idea is that governments
maximize their nations’ welfare by unilaterally setting trade barriers so as to exploit their
country’s monopoly and monopsony power in world markets. A well-known implication of this
theory is that countries that set their trade barriers optimally are made worse off by unilateral
trade liberalization, while binding reciprocal trade agreements between countries makes them
better off. Many trade theorists have gone on to argue that the cooperative and non-cooperative
payoffs from trade liberalization implied by the optimal tariff literature take on the form of a
classic prisoner’s dilemma. In that setting, the dominant strategy of countries acting unilaterally is
to pick the inefficient outcome of maintaining their trade barriers, while the efficient outcome of
jointly eliminating trade barriers can only be achieved through a binding reciprocal trade
agreement between countries.
                                                          
1 Prominent examples of this type of agreement are: the Canada-United States Free Trade Agreement
(CFTA) involving the United States (U.S.) and Canada; the North American Free Trade Agreement
(NAFTA) involving the CFTA and Mexico; and the European Union (EU) expansion involving the EU,
Austria, Finland, Sweden and more recently Mexico.
2 Some small countries, such as Mexico undertook some unilateral liberalization before negotiating a
regional free trade agreement with a large trading partner. These unilateral programs were limited to the
partial reduction of import taxes on goods. This pales in comparison to the trade liberalization undertaken
in the regional agreements, which is designed to eliminate all tariff and non-tariff barriers to not only goods
trade, but also services trade and international capital flows. Adding to this is empirical work by Roland-
Host, Reinert and Sheills (1994) which found the pre-liberalization levels of North American import
protection provided by actual import tariffs in 1988 were extremely low when compared with the protection
levels implied by tariff-equivalent estimates of non-tariff barriers.2
Fluctuations in the terms of trade drive the prisoners’ dilemma theory of reciprocal trade
liberalization. Unilateral liberalization creates an excess supply of the country’s exportable and an
excess demand for the country’s importable, which leads to a deterioration of their terms of trade
and a fall in their real income. The loss of real income typically outweighs the gains from
removing the deadweight losses associated with trade barriers, so the liberalizing country is made
worse off. At the same time the trading partners of the liberalizing country are made better off by
because their terms of trade improve. In contrast, reciprocal agreements have a negligible impact
on the terms of trade of all trading partners, so all countries gain by the size of the deadweight
losses associated with trade barriers. This comes about because one country’s excess supply of
exportables satisfies another country’s excess demand for importables. It is easy to see this in the
simple case of symmetric trading partners where a reciprocal trade agreement would leave the
terms of trade of all countries unchanged.
A key assumption supporting this theory is that countries can influence their terms of trade
through their trade policies. This has led economists to question the relevance of the prisoners’
dilemma theory in explaining the recent shift to reciprocal agreements involving small and large
countries/regions, since the actions of small countries are assumed to have little influence on their
own terms of trade. Others have responded to this by arguing that the process of reciprocal
liberalization is purely motivated by political considerations, such as regional defense. Bagwell
and Staiger (1998) evaluate these competing views within the context of a theoretical model in
which governments are motivated by political and terms-of-trade considerations. Within their
framework they show that more general government objectives do not change the view that
reciprocal trade agreements provide an escape from a terms-of-trade driven prisoner’s dilemma,
and that this is all that reciprocal agreements do.
This paper examines the issue in another way by directly estimating the cooperative and non-
cooperative payoffs implicit in actual free trade agreements negotiated between small and large
countries to see if they take the form of the prisoners’ dilemma. My analysis lends support to the
terms-of-trade driven prisoners’ dilemma theory of reciprocal trade liberalization. Using
simulation results from a quantitative trade, model calibrated to North American data, I show that
the Canadian-US Free Trade Agreement (CFTA) and North American Free Trade Agreement
(NAFTA) take on the two essential elements of the terms-of-trade driven prisoners’ dilemma.
First, I show that if the countries/regions involved in these agreements had unilaterally liberalized
their trade by the same amount specified by the CFTA and NAFTA they would have been made3
worse off, while their regional trading partners would have been made better off. Next, I show
that the countries/regions involved in these agreements are indeed better off by pursuing
reciprocal trade liberalization along the lines specified by the CFTA and NAFTA.
The method used in this paper to measure welfare gains from trade liberalization is quite
different from earlier quantitative analyses of the CFTA and NAFTA. Previous analysis relied on
static computable general equilibrium (SCGE).
3 Despite their complexity these models ignore
three important dynamic consequences of trade liberalization which causes them to misestimate
the welfare gains from trade liberalization.
First, static models limit the world supply of capital to that available in the pre-liberalized
steady state. Therefore, static welfare and output gains associated with liberalization come from a
reallocation of capital across sectors and countries. This ignores the fact that capital accumulation
is generally more efficient under liberalized trade, because trade barriers on durable goods are
essentially a tax on investment, and therefore understates the potential welfare and output gains
that accrue from liberalization.
Some static researchers have attempted to rectify this weakness by incorporating exogenous
increases in the supply of capital and/or total factor productivity in their quantitative analysis
(see, for examples, the NAFTA studies of Brown, Deardorff and Stern (1992) and Sorbazo
(1994)). In the absence of a fully specified dynamic model it is impossible to quantify the
appropriate size of the capital accumulation and its likely effect on consumption, labor effort and
ultimately welfare, so despite claims to contrary these studies offer no guide to the dynamic
consequences of trade liberalization.
Second, static trade models also potentially underestimate the gains from liberalization by not
allowing for trade in financial assets, which is a by-product of restricting national current
accounts to zero. This comes about because capital flows serve three basic (although not mutually
exclusive) purposes, which directly raise national and international welfare. By trading
international assets agents can achieve a higher level of welfare by maintaining smooth
consumption paths while undertaking major capital investment and sectoral reallocation of factors
following liberalization. Next, international capital flows raise welfare by allowing for a more
rapid adjustment to the new policy environment. Finally, by trading international assets agents
can achieve a more efficient allocation of resources across countries.
                                                          
3 See, for examples, conference volumes by Greenway and Whalley (1992), Lustig, Bosworth and
Lawerence (1992), Francois and Shiells (1994), Kehoe and Kehoe (1995), and Francois and Reinert (1997).4
Third, the appropriate measure of the change in welfare from liberalization is the permanent
change in pre-liberalization steady state consumption that has the same present value as the
consumption path that agents experience along the transition path to the post-liberalization steady
state. There is no transition path in static models because they explicitly assume that trade
liberalization agreements are fully implemented at the date they are signed and that factors of
production are perfectly mobile. In other words, static models assume that the economy jumps
from the pre-liberalized to the post-liberalized steady state at the time the agreement is signed. In
this setting the change in welfare from liberalization is simply measured as the difference
between the post- and pre-liberalized consumption. This approach potentially overstates the
welfare gains from liberalization if there are significant costs associated with reallocating factors
of production or if trade policies are phased-in over a long period of time.
I overcome these limitations and in the process more accurately measure the welfare effects of
trade liberalization by utilizing a dynamic computable general equilibrium model (DCGE). The
model developed in this paper incorporates, capital accumulation, trade in financial assets, costs
of reallocating factors of production and a slow phase-in of trade policy changes. In a companion
paper, Kouparitsas (1998) I analyze the dynamic gains from trade. I show that ignoring capital
accumulation and trade in financial assets reduces the welfare gains of trade liberalization, while
ignoring the costs of reallocating factors of production and the slow phase-in of policies
overstates the welfare gains of trade liberalization.
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. The North American trade model is
described in detail in section 2. Model parameterization and the method used generate the
model’s transitional dynamics are discussed in section 3. Section 4 reports the papers main results
on unilateral vs. reciprocal liberalization. The paper concludes in section 5 by way of a brief
summary of the papers main results and suggestions for future empirical research.
2  A model of North American trade
The model developed in this paper is similar to earlier DCGE studies of U.S. unilateral trade
liberalization by Goulder and Eichengreen (1992) and multilateral liberalization of the Asia
Pacific region by McKibbin and Wilcoxen (1995). The main difference between the present paper
and these earlier studies is that I am interested in the consequences of unilateral and reciprocal
liberalization across North American countries. I follow these earlier studies by modeling the
countries/regions of interest individually (U.S. and Canada in the case of the CFTA analysis, and5
the CFTA region and Mexico in the case of the NAFTA analysis), while consigning the
remaining countries to a residual rest of the world (ROW). All countries/regions, including the
ROW, are fully specified in the sense that production, consumption, investment, work effort and
trade decisions are the result of explicit optimization decisions.
The inclusion of a fully specified ROW ensures that all quantities and prices are determined
within the model. This avoids the need for ad hoc residual ROW supply and demand equations
and constant import prices that are used in partial equilibrium dynamic studies, such as,
Keuschnigg and Kohler (1997) and Jorgenson and Ho (1994). This feature of the model is an
important part of the present study, and arguably all trade liberalization analysis, since I am
interested in the effects of unilateral and reciprocal trade liberalization on the liberalizing
countries’ terms of trade.
Figure 1 provides a summary of the domestic and international goods and factor flows in the
model. Each country/region has five production industries: primary raw materials, non-durable
manufactures, durable manufactures, construction, and services. Primary raw materials, non-
durable manufactures and durable manufactures are traded goods, while construction and services
are non-traded goods. Primary goods include agriculture and mining. These goods are largely
used as intermediate inputs in the production of non-durable and durable manufactured goods.
Non-durable manufactures include food processing, beverages, chemicals, textiles, paper and
apparel. Non-durable manufactures are used as an intermediate input in the production of other
goods and a non-durable consumption good. Durable goods include basic metal and non-metal
products, wood and furniture products, machinery and transportation equipment. Construction
includes residential and non-residential structures. The production and household capital stocks
are made up from investment of durable manufactures, construction goods and service sector
inputs. Services cover utilities, finance, insurance, real estate, transportation, and retail and
wholesale activities. Services are largely used as a non-durable consumption good. In the
following discussion industries are indexed by i or j, while countries/regions are indexed by h or
.
2.1  Preferences
Each countryhas a single infinitely lived representative household that maximizes its lifetime
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where  1 0 < < β ,  1 0 < < l c θ  for all. β denotes the household’s subjective rate of time
discount and  σ / 1  is the household’s intertemporal elasticity of substitution.
Consumption is an aggregate of non-durable consumption goods t ndl and the service flow
from the household durable goods, which is assumed to be proportional to the stock of household
durable goods t dl . Non-durable goods and the flow of services from household durable goods are
aggregated according to a constant elasticity of substitution (CES) function:
() η η η ω ω − − − − + = 1
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where  1 0 ≤ ≤ l c ω and 0 > η  for all. The elasticity of substitution between non-durable
consumption goods and durable services is  η / 1 . Different varieties of non-durable consumption
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where  1 0 ≤ ≤ l cj ω , 1 ≤ ∑ j cjl ω and 0 > κ  for all. The elasticity of substitution between
different varieties of non-durable consumption goods is κ / 1 .
2.2  Production technology
Following the static CGE literature I make the standard multi-sector assumption that sector j’s
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where  1 0 ≤ ≤ l yj ω and 0 > ε  for all j,. The first level of production involves a “value-added”
term  t j va l and an “intermediate goods” term  t j m l . The elasticity of substitution between the
value-added and intermediate inputs in sector j is  j ε / 1 .
The value-added term is described by Cobb-Douglas technology, which uses capital 
s
t j k l  and
labor services
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where  1 0 ≤ < l j θ  for all j,.
The other factor of production is the intermediate goods term, which is a composite of
intermediate inputs from all five sectors. In the following discussion t ij m l denotes the flow of
intermediate goods from sector i to sector j in country . These different types of intermediate
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where  1 0 ≤ ≤ l ij α ,  1 = ∑ i ijl α  and  0 > ψ  for all i, j,. The elasticity of substitution between
different types intermediate inputs in sector j is j ψ / 1 .
2.3  Investment behavior
There are two types of physical investment in this model. First, firms and households invest in
physical capital goods that are either used as inputs in the production of goods or household
services. Production capital t xl and household durable t sl investment is a composite of durable
manufactures t z l 3 , construction t z l 4 and service t z l 5 goods. The three types of investment goods
are aggregated according to a CES function:
() ∑
− − = +
j
t j zj t t z s x υ υ ω 1
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l l l l  , (7)
where  1 0 ≤ ≤ l zj ω , 1 = ∑ j zjl ω and 0 > υ for all j,. The elasticity of substitution between
different varieties of investment goods is υ / 1 .8
I assume that production and household capital goods depreciate at a rate δ . Another feature
of the dynamic model is that it allows for costs of adjusting sectoral and aggregate capital stocks.
I use a quadratic aggregate cost of adjustment function in which the size of the adjustment costs is
determined by the parameter ξ . Higher values of ξ  imply greater adjustment costs. Using this
notation I can describe the accumulation of production capital t j k l and household durable
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where  1 0 ≤ < δ , 0 > ξ  and  l l k x /  and  l l d s / denote the steady state investment to capital stock
and household durable investment to durable stock ratios, for all .
I also allow for costs of adjusting sectoral capital stocks. I employ a similar convex sectoral
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where  0 > j ξ and  l l k k j / denotes the steady state ratio of sector j to aggregate capital for all  , j .
Second, firms store goods for later use as intermediate inputs in the production of future
goods. The time period in the model is a quarter. Empirical evidence from Ramey (1989)
suggests that intermediate goods require one quarter to put in place. Based on this finding I
assume that period t+1 intermediate inputs 1 + t ij m l are produced in period t.
2.4  Trade flows
The model allows for trade between the North American countries of interest and the ROW.
Where the ROW is a composite of Canadian and U.S. (CFTA area and Mexican) trading partners
in the case of the CFTA (NAFTA). Let t jh f l denote country ‘s private use of good j produced in
country h. For   ≠ h , t jh f l denotes country ‘s private imports of good j from country h. Private9
final expenditure for good j is described by the following using a CES aggregation function for
foreign and home goods:
() ∑ ∑
− −
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where 1 0 ≤ ≤ l jh ω , 1 = ∑ h jhl ω and 0 > j µ  for all j,.
4 Recall t j c l describes non-durable
consumption of good j,  t j z l describes investment using good j, and t ij m l denotes the flow of
intermediate goods from sector i to sector j at time t.  The elasticity of substitution between home
produced and all imported varieties of good j is j µ / 1 .
2.5  Government
Each country has a government that imposes tariffs and non-tariff barriers on imported goods.
The tariff rate in countryfor good j imported from country h is t jhl τ . It is difficult to model non-
tariff barriers (NTBs) directly so I take the standard approach of using so-called tariff equivalent
NTBs. A tariff equivalent NTB is simply the level of tariff protection that would yield the same
allocation of output, expenditure and factors of production as the NTB in the pre-liberalized
steady state. The countrytariff equivalent NTB for good j imported from country h is t jhl ρ . The
revenue from the tariff and the quota rents from the NTBs are rebated by lump-sum payments,
denoted by t TRl and t QRl respectively. The government also levies a lump-sum tax t LTl to finance
its current spending. Let jht p to denote the price of country h’s good j in terms of the numeraire
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4 Differentiating goods by location is necessary to rule out complete specialization. See Baxter (1992) for a
discussion of how complete specialization, along the lines of Ricardian comparative advantage, emerges in
a dynamic Heckscher-Ohlin-Samuleson model where goods are not differentiated by production location.
5 I maintain ROW non-durable manufactured goods as the numeraire throughout the analysis.10
where t jh g l is the country’s government consumption of good j from country h. Combining
these results implies ∑∑ =
hi t ih iht t g p LT l l . For simplicity I assume that the public sector and
the private sector have the same aggregation function for all goods, so real government spending





t jh jh t j
j
j g g µ µ ω 1
1
1
l l l  , (16)
Real government spending is held constant in the trade policy simulations.
2.6  Resource constraints
Labor t Nl  is a non-reproducible factor of production. Labor is mobile between sectors t j N l within
in a country, subject to small adjustment costs. Following my approach to sectoral capital
adjustment costs I employ a quadratic cost of adjustment function where the costs of adjusting
labor in sector j are governed by a parameter  j ϕ , where higher levels imply higher adjustment
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where  0 > j ϕ  for all  , j . The household’s endowment of total hours is normalized to unity,
which imposes the following constraint on labor and leisure:
0 1 = − − t t N L l l  for all. (19)
Household trade one period bonds t bl . The price of these assets in terms of the numeraire
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Each regional economy is also subject to the following sectoral resource constraints:
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Finally, regional economies are subject to an international bond market constraint:
0 = ∑
l
lt b . (22)
2.7  Equilibrium and model solution
The representative household in each country/region owns all productive inputs. Each period
households maximize their utility by selling their capital services, labor services and intermediate
goods to firms in the same country on the competitive market, taking prices as given, and buying
goods from domestic and foreign firms on the competitive market, taking prices as given.
Households also trade assets internationally with foreign residents on the competitive market,
taking the price as given. Firms maximize profits by selling their goods on the competitive
market, taking prices as given, to both domestic and foreign residents and buying capital services,
labor inputs and intermediate goods from households in the same economy on the competitive
market, taking prices as given. The competitive equilibrium is described by the sequences of
capital, labor, consumption, investment, bonds and their associated prices that satisfy the regional
representative household’s and firm’s optimization problems and the market clearing conditions.
I assume that the agents have perfect foresight which allows me to follow Mendoza and Tesar
(1998) in solving for the model’s post-liberalization steady state and transitional dynamics using
a linearized version of the shooting algorithm proposed by Lipton, Poterba, Sachs, and Summers
(1982). This approach is necessary because the solution of the transitional dynamics of trade
liberalization requires the simultaneous solution of the paths of foreign debt accumulation and the
net foreign asset positions in the post-liberalization steady state.
Following Mendoza and Tesar (1998) I take an initial guess of the long-run bond positions to
which countries converge after trade liberalization and solve for the post-liberalization steady
state. I then use the linear approximation algorithm of King, Plosser and Rebelo (1988) to
generate the transitional dynamics around this new steady state. Using this approximation I
simulate the transitional dynamics for 2,500 periods by setting the initial conditions to the pre-
liberalization values of the state variables. The simulations produce a path of foreign debt
dynamics that converges to some long-run position. If this long-run position differs from the
initial guess the post-liberalization debt positions are updated and the process is repeated. The
number of iterations it takes to converge depends on the non-linearity of the model. For example,12
this method converges in just a few iterations if household preferences and production functions
are assumed to be Cobb-Douglas.
3  Benchmark parameters
The model must be parameterized before I can apply numerical solution methods. Direct
estimation of all the model’s parameters is ruled out by the fact that there is insufficient
international data to estimate all preference, production, and trade parameters. Researchers
working with SCGE models have overcome this problem by using model calibration (see, for
example, Shoven and Whalley 1992). More recently this approach has been extended DCGE
models of international trade (see, for example, Backus, Kehoe and Kydland (1995)). Calibration
essentially involves two steps. First, the researcher chooses a set of elasticities that describe the
degree of substitution in consumption, production, and trade. Second, given this set of elasticities
the researcher chooses shares in preference, production, and trade aggregation functions so that
the model’s steady state matches actual expenditure, output, production, and trade shares
estimated from data at a specific point in time (or the base year).
In my case I draw on the SCGE and DCGE literatures whenever possible. Multi-sector
features of the dynamic model are calibrated using elasticities from well-known static studies:
Roland-Holst, Reinert, and Shiells (1994); Brown, Deardorff and Stern (1992); Sorbazo (1994)
and Whalley (1985). Similarly, dynamic features of the model are calibrated by drawing on the
parameter set used in the international DCGE literature. I follow most SCGE studies of the CFTA
and NAFTA in calibrating the model’s base years or pre-liberalization steady states to data from
1988. Table 1 summarizes the model’s parameters.
3.1  Preference parameters
I follow the DCGE literature in specifying that the intertemporal elasticity of substitution σ / 1  is
0.5 and that the consumption/leisure share parameter l c θ is consistent with 20 percent of the
agent’s total time being devoted to market activity. This is more general than the utility functions
used in Goulder and Eichengreen (1992) and McKibbin and Wilcoxen (1995). They assumed a
fixed supply of labor by imposing that  1 = l c θ . The subjective discount factorβ is set to 0.9852,
which implies an annual interest rate of about 5 percent. My benchmark elasticities of substitution
for household durable  η / 1 and non-durable  κ / 1 goods are set to unity (that is, nested household
preferences are Cobb-Douglas), which is typical in SCGE studies. Finally,  l c ω and l cj ω are13
calibrated so that they match national accounts estimates of household non-durable and durable
expenditure shares for 1988.
3.2  Production and investment parameters
The description of production in the previous section follows the static CGE literature by
assuming a two level CES structure, with a Cobb-Douglas value-added component and
intermediate goods aggregated by a CES function. I rely on Bruno’s (1984) estimate of the
elasticity of substitution between value-added component and intermediate goods aggregate. He
finds that across industrial countries this elasticity is 0.5. This suggests that there is greater
substitution possibilities in my dynamic model than is typical in static CGE studies which assume
production is Leontief by imposing zero elasticities of substitution. I follow the static literature in
assuming that the elasticity of substitution between different types of intermediate goods is the
same as the elasticity of substitution between value-added and intermediate inputs. All other
production parameters are derived from cost shares estimated from the input-output tables of
Canada, Mexico and the U.S. The ROW is largely made up of large industrial countries, so I
model their production functions using U.S. input-output data.
The quarterly depreciation rateδ is set at 3 percent and the aggregate capital adjustment
parameterξ  is set to 10, which is consistent with most quarterly DCGE studies. My estimates of
the sectoral labor and capital adjustment costs function parameters are based on the multi-sector
international real business cycle analysis of Kouparitsas (1996). I show in that paper that the
observed volatility of U.S. sectoral investment and labor hours is implies relatively higher
adjustment costs in the primary sector, which is consistent with the view that primary sector
factors of production are more industry specific.
There is a scant empirical literature on the degree of substitution between different types of
household and industrial durable goods. In light of this, I follow the SCGE literature’s approach
to non-durable aggregation by setting the elasticity of substitution between different types of
durable goods to unity. The  l xj ω ‘s are calibrated so that they match estimates of expenditure
shares for investment goods from national account data for 1988.
3.3  Trade flow and policy parameters
Explicit tariff rates are readily available from various national and international trade
organizations and previous static studies. In contrast, it is difficult to incorporate NTBs such as14
quotas and other non-price restrictions in SCGE models, so researchers use so-called tariff
equivalent measures of NTBs in their quantitative analysis. A tariff equivalent NTB is simply the
tariff that would be necessary to generate the same sectoral and international distribution of
output, expenditure and factors of production as the NTB in the pre-liberalized steady state. Table
2 provides an overview of Roland-Host, Reinert and Shiells’ (1994) comprehensive estimates of
the levels of tariff and tariff equivalent NTB protection that existed prior to the signing of the
CFTA and NAFTA in 1988. For comparability with earlier static analyses I set the pre-CFTA and
NAFTA levels of protection in my model to match Roland-Holst et al.’s estimates. The resulting
sectoral and international distribution of output, expenditure and factors of production are close to
the base year data. This suggests that the alternative strategy of estimating the tariff equivalent
NTB’s directly from the dynamic model using the actual sectoral and international distribution of
output, expenditure and factors of production would yield values similar to those estimated by
Roland-Holst et al.
The CFTA was signed in 1988 and was designed to eliminate all trade barriers between
Canada and the U.S., described in Table 2. The majority of the tariff reductions were phased in
over a 10 to 15 year period, starting the first quarter of 1989 and ending in 2004. NAFTA
followed the signing of the CFTA in 1992, so I model NAFTA as the joint free trade agreement
between the CFTA area and Mexico. In practical terms NAFTA, it involves the removal of
barriers to Mexican exports to CFTA area, and CFTA area exports to Mexico. Like the CFTA,
the majority of tariff reductions are expected to be phased-in over 10 to 15 years, starting in the
first quarter of 1994 and ending in 2009. All policy simulations begin in the period following the
signing of the initial trade agreement (first quarter of 1988 for CFTA and first quarter of 1993 for
NAFTA). I conduct the simulations as if agents in the world economy perfectly anticipated the
path of trade liberalization described above. This assumes that agents knew at the date of the
initial signing that the CFTA and NAFTA would be implemented one year after the signing and
phased-in over a 15 year period.
There is a wide range of values for the elasticity of substitution between home and foreign
goods j µ / 1 used in the quantitative trade literature. I consider a range of values. My benchmark
model adopts an elasticity of 1.5 for all goods, which is widely used in the international DCGE
literature (see, for example, Backus, et al (1995)) and multi-country static CGE studies of trade
liberation, such as Whalley (1985). My lower bound estimates are based on the empirical studies
of Shiells and Reinert (1993) for Canada and the U.S., and Sobarzo (1994) for Mexico, which15
were used by Roland-Host, Reinert and Shiells’ (1994) in their analysis of the CFTA and
NAFTA. They find the elasticity of substitution is closer to unity. My upper bound is based on
Brown, Deardorff, and Stern’s (1992) trade liberalization analysis, which uses an elasticity of
substitution of 3. My sensitivity analysis suggests that the welfare gains depend critically on these
elasticities of substitution: trade liberalization generates significantly lower welfare effects if
there is a low degree of substitution between home and foreign goods. However, my sensitivity
analysis shows that the main results reported in this paper are robust to the range of parameters
used in quantitative trade liberalization analyses. Note that I adjust the  l jk ω ’s across these
experiments so that the models’ trade shares match the pattern found in trade flow data for the
North American countries/regions in 1988.
4  Unilateral vs. reciprocal liberalization
Below, I report the results of simulations of the quantitative North American trade model under
various unilateral and reciprocal trade liberalization scenarios. Before turning to those findings I
describe the welfare measure used in this paper.
4.1  Welfare analysis
I calculate the welfare effects of liberalization by measuring the effect on country ‘s
representative households’ lifetime utility l U . For example, let l λ represent the permanent
percentage change in the level of pre-liberalization consumption in countrythat would make
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where u is the representative household’s momentary utility function and() l l L c ,  is country ’s
representative households respective steady state levels of consumption and leisure in the pre-
liberalization environment. In other words,  l lλ c measures the amount by which you have to
change consumption in the pre-liberalized environment to make households as well off as under
trade liberalization ( l λ is typically referred to as the compensating variation). If  0 > l λ
households in countryare better off than they were in the pre-liberalization steady state.16
4.2  Welfare effects of reciprocal liberalization
The top row of Table 3 reports the welfare calculations from the CFTA and NAFTA experiments.
The first three columns of Table 4 show that the compensating variation in consumption required
to leave households indifferent between the initial steady state and the CFTA is 2.07 percent for
Canada and 0.21 percent for the U.S.  Based on these results, the CFTA leads to welfare
improvements for Canada and the U.S. The last three columns of Table 4 report the same
calculations for the NAFTA experiments. My estimates suggest that NAFTA will improve
welfare of the CFTA area and Mexico. The compensating variation in consumption is 0.08
percent for the CFTA area and 1.12 percent for Mexico. In each case the welfare improvements
are greater for the small country. Note also that the ROW also gains from the CFTA and NAFTA.
4.3  Aggregate effects of reciprocal liberalization
The middle panel of Table 3 reports the aggregate steady state effects of the CFTA in the first
three columns and NAFTA in the last three columns. The CFTA is estimated to have had a larger
effect on North America than NAFTA. Beyond this the response to the CFTA and NAFTA
policies are quite similar. My estimates suggest that the reciprocal agreements will or have led to
an expansion of output, investment, consumption, labor hours and trade for both liberalizing
partners. The smaller countries are expected to enjoy a much larger gain in their steady state
output. Under the CFTA U.S. steady state gross domestic product (GDP) is estimated to have
risen by 2.04 percent, which is considerably smaller than the estimated 11.09 percent increase in
Canadian steady state GDP. Similarly, under NAFTA Mexico’s steady state GDP is predicted to
rise by 6.87 percent, while the CFTA area’s steady state GDP is expected to rise by 0.55 percent.
As predicted liberalization leads to greater capital accumulation in the liberalizing countries.
The fall in the real rental rate implies that the supply of capital increases by more than the
demand for capital. Labor effort rises despite the increase in wealth. This is driven by the
significant rise in the real wage.
As expected bilateral trade flows increase following trade liberalization. The CFTA is
estimated to have increased the level of U.S.-Canada trade flows by 60 percent. The impact of
NAFTA is smaller, with CFTA-Mexico trade flows expected to rise by 40 percent.
Another feature of these simulation results is the prediction that trade liberalization between a
large and small country leads to a large capital inflow to the latter country. In the case of the
CFTA inflows to Canada are estimated to have increased by 5.43 percent of annual GDP, while17
the inflows to Mexico under NAFTA are expected to rise by 3.84 percent of annual GDP.
Looking across the row it is clear that the Canadian (and Mexican) capital inflows are jointly
driven by capital flows from the U.S. (CFTA) and ROW.
Finally, these reciprocal agreements are also expected to have an asymmetric impact on the
terms of trade of the large and small country, with the terms of trade of the small country
deteriorating by more than their larger liberalizing partners’.
4.4  Sectoral effects of reciprocal liberalization
The lower panel of Table 3 describes in detail the sectoral steady state effects of the CFTA in the
first three columns and NAFTA in the last three columns. The CFTA is estimated to have
expanded the steady state output of all U.S. and Canadian industries. Underlying this sectoral
response is a large increase in the volume of U.S.-Canada trade in durable manufactured goods.
Under NAFTA all non-primary sectors are predicted to expand in the CFTA area and Mexico in
the long run. In contrast to its North American partners, Mexico’s primary sector is also expected
to expand under NAFTA. Sectoral changes in labor hours and capital investment tend to mimic
changes in sectoral GDP.
4.5  Welfare effects of unilateral liberalization
Table 4 describes in detail the results of Canada and the U.S. (CFTA area and Mexico)
unilaterally liberalizing their trade by the same level agreed to in the CFTA (NAFTA). In the
upper panel I report the results of the CFTA experiments involving Canada and the U.S. In the
lower panel I report the findings of the NAFTA experiments involving the CFTA area and
Mexico. The Table is organized the same way as Table 3, but I limit the results to the welfare and
aggregate effects of unilateral liberalization. The first three columns report the results of the
smaller partner’s unilateral liberalization (Canada in the upper panel and Mexico in the lower
panel). The middle three columns report the results of the larger partner’s unilateral liberalization
(U.S. in the upper panel and CFTA area in the lower panel). The final three columns repeat the
reciprocal liberalization results previously reported in Table 3.
Three basic results emerge from these experiments. First, unilateral liberalization makes the
liberalizing country worse off and its regional trading partner better off. Second, the liberalizing
country’s terms of trade deteriorate following liberalization, while its trading partner’s terms of
trade improve. Finally, the trade flows between the liberalizing country and its regional trading
partner rise, while trade flows between the liberalizing country and the ROW fall.18
4.6  Basic intuition
Table 4 provides insight into the way that trade liberalization affects the liberalizing country and
its trading partners. The intuition is essentially a dynamic analogue of the well-know unilateral
liberalization analysis presented in textbook discussions of optimal tariffs. Trade liberalization
creates an excess demand for the liberalizing country’s imported goods and an excess supply of
the liberalizing country’s exported goods. This lowers the relative price of the liberalizing country
goods in terms of foreign goods. In other words, it leads to a worsening of the liberalizing
country’s terms of trade. This lowers the income/wealth of the liberalizing country and raises the
income/wealth of its trading partners.
Liberalization lowers the cost of capital (that is, it shifts the supply curve of capital to the
right) for all countries/regions. This leads to greater capital accumulation, which in turn raises the
demand for labor for both the liberalizing country and its trading partners. Real wages rise by
relatively more in non-liberalizing country because in the liberalizing country the increased
demand for labor is offset by an increased supply of labor that comes from the fall in wealth due
to the deterioration of the terms of trade. Real wages rise in the non-liberalizing country because
greater wealth decreases the supply of labor. In fact, the wealth effect dominates the increased
demand from labor coming from cheaper capital inputs, so labor effort is reduced in the non-
liberalizing country.
The asymmetric wealth effects of unilateral trade liberalization are also evident in
consumption. Lower wealth in the liberalizing country lowers consumption, this is only partially
offset by higher real wages, which raise consumption. In contrast, the wealth and real wage
effects work in the same direction in the non-liberalizing country, which leads to a sizeable
increase in consumption.
4.7  Prisoners’ dilemma
Table 5 summarizes the welfare data from Table 4 in the form of a standard two agent non-
cooperative game in which the choices are to unilaterally liberalize trade or maintain trade
barriers. The upper panel describes the game underlying the CFTA and the lower panel describes
the game underlying NAFTA. The lower left element in each cell is the payoff to the large
country while the upper right element is the payoff to the small country. Both games take on the
form of the classic prisoners’ dilemma. In each case liberalization is strictly dominated, so that in
the absence of cooperation the outcome is the inefficient maintenance of barriers. In other words,19
the model predicts that in the absence of enforceable reciprocal agreements, such as the CFTA
and NAFTA, the North American countries would maintain their trade barriers.
4.8  Sensitivity analysis
There is a wide range of estimates of the elasticity of substitution between home and foreign
goods used in the quantitative trade literature. Table 6 adds to the analysis of Table 5 by looking
at the payoff structure using different trade elasticity estimates from two well-known static CGE
studies of the CFTA and NAFTA.  The low elasticity panel refers to payoffs when the model is
simulated with the elasticities used by Roland-Host, Reinert and Shiells’ (1994). The high
elasticity panel refers to the payoffs when the model is simulated with the elasticities used by
Brown, Deardorff and Stern (1992). They estimate the elasticity of substitution between home
and foreign goods to be 3, which compares with the benchmark model elasticity of 1.5, and
Roland-Host et al estimate of around 1.
Although the magnitudes are different the results of these experiments are qualitatively
identical to those from the benchmark model. The most obvious quantitative difference is that the
welfare gain (loss) from reciprocal (unilateral) liberalization is much greater (smaller) with higher
elasticities of substitution. This comes about because relative prices are less responsive under
higher elasticities of substitution, so the negative wealth effects of unilateral trade liberalization
are reduced as elasticities rise. Plus, the deadweight losses associated with trade barriers rise as
demand curves become more elastic.
5  Conclusion
Trade theory has long argued that while it may be in the best interests of large a country to
pursue reciprocal trade agreements to escape from a terms-of-trade driven prisoners’ dilemma,
the best course of action for a small country is always unilateral trade liberalization. This
prediction is inconsistent with the growing trend toward reciprocal trade agreements involving a
small country and large country/region. Using simulation results from a quantitative trade model I
am able to shed light on why small and large countries pursue reciprocal trade agreements. I show
that the payoffs from unilateral and reciprocal trade liberalization implicit in recent North
American trade agreements between a small country and a large country/region take on the form
of the well-known prisoners’ dilemma. In particular, I find that irrespective of country size
unilateral liberalization makes the liberalizing country worse off, while making its regional
trading partner better off, and that cooperative agreements make all liberalizing partners better20
off. These estimates run counter to the prediction of trade theory because my model violates the
key assumption that small countries can not influence their terms of trade. In fact, I show that
trade liberalization can have a significant impact on a small country’s terms of trade for a wide
range of estimates of the elasticity of substitution between domestic and foreign goods.
My quantitative analysis is limited to two recent North American trade agreements. An
interesting extension of this paper, and a further test of the prisoners’ dilemma theory of
reciprocal trade liberalization, would be to estimate the payoffs implicit in other regional trade
agreements involving small and large countries, such as the recent expansion of the European
Community.
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 ω c 0.80
 1/κ 1
 ω c1 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.08 0.01 0.01
 ω c2 0.17 0.17 0.17 0.24 0.17 0.17




 ω i3 0.52 0.52 0.52 0.41 0.52 0.52
 ω i4 0.39 0.39 0.39 0.47 0.39 0.39






  θ 1 0.35 0.35 0.35 0.35 0.35 0.35
  ω y1 0.70 0.43 0.34 0.96 0.35 0.27
  α 11 0.29 0.32 0.36 0.31 0.31 0.35
  α 21 0.05 0.06 0.07 0.38 0.07 0.07
  α 31 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.04 0.01 0.01
  α 41 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
  α 51 0.64 0.61 0.56 0.27 0.61 0.57
  ξ 1 100
  ϕ1 100
 Non-Durable Man.
  θ 2 0.48 0.48 0.48 0.63 0.48 0.48
  ω y2 0.64 0.36 0.32 0.74 0.33 0.27
  α 12 0.13 0.13 0.13 0.36 0.12 0.13
  α 22 0.51 0.56 0.59 0.44 0.57 0.58
  α 32 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.00 0.01 0.01
  α 42 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
  α 52 0.36 0.30 0.27 0.19 0.30 0.28
  ξ 2 10
  ϕ2 10
 Durable Man.
  θ 3 0.32 0.32 0.32 0.57 0.32 0.32
  ω y3 0.63 0.32 0.22 0.78 0.23 0.16
  α 13 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.03 0.00 0.00
  α 23 0.03 0.03 0.03 0.03 0.03 0.03
  α 33 0.55 0.60 0.68 0.51 0.63 0.6824
Table 1  (cont.)
Benchmark parameters
CFTA NAFTA All
Canada US ROW Mexico CFTA ROW
  α 43 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
  α 53 0.42 0.37 0.29 0.42 0.34 0.29
  ξ 3 10
  ϕ3 10
 Construction
  θ 4 0.34 0.34 0.34 0.30 0.34 0.34
  ω y4 0.65 0.37 0.27 0.75 0.27 0.21
  α 14 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
  α 24 0.01 0.02 0.02 0.02 0.02 0.02
  α 34 0.30 0.35 0.44 0.60 0.37 0.43
  α 44 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
  α 54 0.68 0.63 0.54 0.37 0.61 0.55
  ξ 4 10
  ϕ4 10
 Services
  θ 5 0.33 0.33 0.33 0.60 0.33 0.33
  ω y5 0.81 0.58 0.51 0.98 0.49 0.42
  α 15 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
  α 25 0.01 0.02 0.02 0.04 0.02 0.02
  α 35 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
  α 45 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.02 0.01 0.01
  α 55 0.97 0.97 0.97 0.93 0.97 0.97
  ξ 5 10
  ϕ5 10
Trade
 Primary
  1/µ 1 1.5
   ω 1can 0.62 0.11 0.06
   ω 1usa 0.23 0.66 0.18
   ω 1mex 0.72 0.12 0.05
   ω 1cfta 0.17 0.66 0.22
   ω 1row 0.15 0.22 0.76 0.10 0.22 0.72
 Non-Durable Man.
  1/µ 2 1.5
  ω 2can 0.66 0.08 0.02
  ω 2usa 0.25 0.78 0.12
  ω 2mex 0.73 0.04 0.02
  ω 2cfta 0.18 0.79 0.15
  ω 2row 0.09 0.15 0.86 0.09 0.17 0.84
 Durable Man.
  1/µ 3 1.5
  ω 3can 0.44 0.14 0.02
  ω 3usa 0.41 0.62 0.18
  ω 3mex 0.52 0.06 0.01
  ω 3cfta 0.32 0.65 0.20
  ω 3row 0.15 0.24 0.80 0.17 0.29 0.78Levels of protection in North America prior to implementation of CFTA and NAFTA
Importer Canada Mexico U.S. ROW Importer Canada Mexico U.S. ROW
Canada 0.01 0.01 0.00 Canada 0.20 0.61 0.27
Mexico 0.00 0.02 0.00 Mexico 0.80 0.81 0.72
U.S. 0.01 0.01 0.01 U.S. 0.61 0.88 0.77
Importer Canada Mexico U.S. ROW Importer Canada Mexico U.S. ROW
Canada 0.18 0.07 0.14 Canada 0.68 0.34 0.44
Mexico 0.04 0.05 0.10 Mexico 0.78 0.41 0.47
U.S. 0.04 0.05 0.10 U.S. 0.16 0.22 0.20
Importer Canada Mexico U.S. ROW Importer Canada Mexico U.S. ROW
Canada 0.04 0.02 0.04 Canada 0.25 0.26 0.31
Mexico 0.01 0.03 0.02 Mexico 0.01 0.13 0.22
U.S. 0.01 0.03 0.03 U.S. 0.39 0.07 0.28
Notes: Roland-Holst et al. (1994) report estimates for 26 sectors. Sectoral aggregates reported in this article are
weighted by 1988 import shares. ROW is rest of the world.
Source: Roland-Holst, Reinert and Shiells (1994)
Table 2
Non-durable manufactured goods








Durable manufactured goodsVariable Canada U.S. ROW Mexico CFTA ROW
Welfare effects 2.07 0.21 0.06 1.12 0.08 0.03
Aggregate effects
Real GDP 11.09 2.04 -0.02 6.87 0.55 -0.01
Real consumption 8.45 1.67 0.17 5.36 0.45 0.06
Labor hours 3.42 0.50 -0.11 3.28 0.17 -0.03
Real wage  8.28 1.67 0.13 5.08 0.48 0.04
Capital stock 19.17 3.68 0.13 8.40 0.66 0.02
Real rental rate -6.31 -1.42 -0.10 -1.38 0.01 -0.01
Total imports 42.57 11.95 1.98 26.07 3.44 0.62
Exports to World 47.39 12.93 -0.68 29.64 3.71 -0.12
   to Canada 60.93 2.51
   to U.S. 56.50 1.94
   to Mexico 41.08 1.29
   to CFTA 38.38 0.60
   to ROW 3.36 -1.05 2.27 -0.24
Terms of trade -0.90 -0.74 1.39 -0.78 -0.29 0.45
Net foreign assets/GDP -5.43 -0.15 0.64 -3.84 0.04 0.19
Sectoral effects
Primary
  Output 17.33 2.32 -0.22 19.39 -0.50 -0.56
  Labor hours 9.43 0.77 -0.34 15.74 -1.17 -0.60
  Capital stock 26.47 3.92 -0.11 23.32 -0.71 -0.55
  Exports 46.51 9.96 -0.83 73.22 5.70 -3.29
Nondurable mfg.
  Output 9.62 3.28 0.02 7.10 1.43 -0.04
  Labor hours 0.28 1.39 -0.12 1.48 0.73 -0.10
  Capital stock 15.89 4.56 0.11 8.12 1.21 -0.04
  Exports 23.27 13.99 0.24 25.43 5.32 -0.25
Durable mfg.
  Output 27.79 3.64 -0.23 7.13 1.00 0.05
  Labor hours 18.48 1.95 -0.35 2.14 0.70 0.02
  Capital stock 36.92 5.14 -0.12 8.82 1.17 0.08
  Exports 56.55 13.16 -0.92 12.13 2.66 0.37
Construction
  Output 9.80 1.65 0.06 6.10 0.37 0.01
  Labor hours 2.20 0.29 -0.06 2.62 0.12 -0.02
  Capital stock 18.11 3.43 0.17 9.33 0.59 0.03
Services
  Output 6.23 1.21 0.05 3.98 0.28 0.01
  Labor hours 0.60 0.06 -0.04 -0.08 0.05 -0.01
  Capital stock 16.26 3.19 0.19 6.45 0.52 0.04
Table 3
Long-run effects of North American Bilateral Trade Agreements
(percentage deviation from pre-liberalization steady state)
CFTA NAFTACFTA
Removal of barriers to Removal of barriers to  Removal of barriers to
U.S.  exports in Canada Canadian exports in U.S. Canadian and U.S. exports
Variable Canada U.S ROW Canada U.S ROW Canada U.S ROW
Welfare effects -5.48 1.33 0.00 7.56 -1.09 0.07 2.07 0.21 0.06
Aggregate effects
Real GDP 6.15 0.54 -0.02 4.44 1.35 0.02 11.09 2.04 -0.02
Real consumption -0.28 1.42 0.04 8.69 0.18 0.15 8.45 1.67 0.17
Labor hours 4.58 -0.37 -0.04 -1.23 0.81 -0.07 3.42 0.50 -0.11
Real wage  0.72 1.18 0.03 7.35 0.40 0.12 8.28 1.67 0.13
Capital stock 5.60 1.79 -0.01 12.66 1.65 0.17 19.17 3.68 0.13
Real rental rate -0.13 -0.97 0.01 -6.23 -0.38 -0.12 -6.31 -1.42 -0.10
Total imports 8.85 7.87 0.77 30.31 2.46 1.95 42.57 11.95 1.98
Exports to World 32.28 2.46 -0.37 11.43 9.40 -0.13 47.39 12.93 -0.68
   to U.S. 32.65 31.02 21.39 -21.58 60.93 2.51
   to Canada 18.65 -1.63 31.57 3.81 56.50 1.94
   to ROW -18.73 1.29 26.75 -2.57 3.36 -1.05
Terms of trade -17.16 5.54 0.62 19.33 -6.45 1.38 -0.90 -0.74 1.39
Net foreign assets/GDP -1.43 -0.26 0.26 -3.64 0.13 0.35 -5.43 -0.15 0.64
NAFTA
Removal of barriers to Removal of barriers to  Removal of barriers to
CFTA exports in Mexico Mexican exports in CFTA Mexican and CFTA exports
Variable Mexico CFTA ROW Mexico CFTA ROW Mexico CFTA ROW
Welfare effects -2.65 0.37 0.00 3.83 -0.29 0.04 1.12 0.08 0.03
Aggregate effects
Real GDP 3.11 0.16 -0.01 3.61 0.36 0.01 6.87 0.55 -0.01
Real consumption -0.32 0.39 0.01 5.66 0.04 0.06 5.36 0.45 0.06
Labor hours 2.94 -0.10 -0.01 0.19 0.25 -0.02 3.28 0.17 -0.03
Real wage  -0.07 0.33 0.01 5.09 0.12 0.04 5.08 0.48 0.04
Capital stock 1.81 0.47 -0.02 6.47 0.15 0.05 8.40 0.66 0.02
Real rental rate 0.81 -0.22 0.02 -2.21 0.23 -0.04 -1.38 0.01 -0.01
Total imports 5.80 2.25 0.16 18.88 0.80 0.65 26.07 3.44 0.62
Exports to World 20.00 0.74 -0.11 7.97 2.75 0.03 29.64 3.71 -0.12
   to CFTA 20.05 19.90 17.43 -15.48 41.08 1.29
   to Mexico 15.78 -0.61 19.17 1.28 38.38 0.60
   to ROW -13.48 0.51 18.32 -0.82 2.27 -0.24
Terms of trade -11.51 1.58 0.14 12.08 -2.01 0.46 -0.78 -0.29 0.45
Net foreign assets/GDP -0.67 -0.09 0.08 -2.93 0.13 0.10 -3.84 0.04 0.19
Table 4
Long-run effects of unilateral and bilateral liberalization
(percentage deviation from pre-liberalization steady state )Welfare payoffs from unilateral 
Canada Liberalize Maintain














CFTAWelfare payoffs from unilateral and bilateral liberalization
High elasticity model
Canada Liberalize Maintain Liberalize Maintain Liberalize Maintain
U.S.  trade barriers trade barriers trade barriers
Liberalize 0.10 7.72 2.07 7.56 5.57 8.85
trade 0.10 -1.40 0.21 -1.09 0.47 -0.81
Maintain -7.89 0.00 -5.48 0.00 -3.11 0.00
barriers 1.43 0.00 1.33 0.00 1.42 0.00
High elasticity model
Mexico Liberalize Maintain Liberalize Maintain Liberalize Maintain
CFTA trade barriers trade barriers trade barriers
Liberalize 0.11 3.77 1.12 3.83 3.50 5.11
trade 0.02 -0.40 0.08 -0.29 0.26 -0.16
Maintain -3.67 0.00 -2.65 0.00 -1.49 0.00
barriers 0.40 0.00 0.37 0.00 0.42 0.00













Notes: i denotes industry—primary, i=1; nondurable manufacturing, i=2; durable manufacturing, i=3;


























Model flow diagram for a representative country
i=1,2,3 i=1,2,3